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LA DIVERSIFICACIÓN Y EL CONTROL FAMILIAR COMO 
DETERMINANTES DEL PERFORMANCE: UN ESTUDIO DE LOS GRUPOS 
EMPRESARIALES COTIZADOS 
Resumen 
El trabajo analiza el impacto individual y conjunto del control familiar y la diversificación en el performance 
de los grandes grupos empresariales españoles, considerando la naturaleza del último propietario de los 
grupos no familiares.  En la investigación se emplea una muestra de noventa y nueve grupos empresariales, 
constituidos cada uno de ellos por una empresa matriz que cotiza en los mercados de valores y el conjunto de 
sociedades dependientes de la misma.  Haciendo uso del  método bietápico de Heckman para eliminar el 
sesgo de selección y la endogeneidad de la propiedad familiar, se plantean diversos modelos donde se analiza 
la influencia tanto de la diversificación como de la naturaleza familiar o no familiar del grupo empresarial en 
el performance, establecido éste último mediante el valor de la q de Tobin.  Los resultados muestran cómo el 
control familiar del grupo empresarial influye negativamente en el valor de la q de Tobin, siendo mayores las 
diferencias entre los grupo grupos familiares y los grupos no familiares controlados por entidades financieras 
y/ó agentes no nacionales.  También se comprueba cómo la diversificación no afecta a la creación de valor, 
bien considerada individualmente, bien teniendo en cuenta el posible efecto moderador de la propiedad 
familiar del grupo empresarial. 
Palabras clave: Empresa familiar; Grupo Empresarial; Diversificación; Performance; Último propietario. 
Código JEL: L25, M21. 
 
DIVERSIFICATION AND FAMILY CONTROL AS DETERMINANTS OF 
PERFORMANCE: A STUDY OF LISTED BUSINESS GROUPS 
Abstract 
The study analyses the individual and joint impact of family control and diversification on the performance 
of major Spanish corporations, considering the nature of the ultimate owner of non-family groups. The study 
uses a sample of ninety-nine Spanish corporations, each comprising a parent company listed on the stock 
exchange and a set of subsidiaries. Heckman’s two-step correction is used to eliminate selection bias and the 
endogeneity of family ownership. Different models are contemplated in which we analyse the impact of both 
diversification and the family nature of a business on performance, established as Tobin’s q-value. The 
results show how family control has a negative impact on Tobin’s q-value, and that differences are greater 
between family groups and non-family groups controlled by banks and/or foreign agents. They also show 
how diversification does not affect the creation of value either individually or considering the possible 
moderating effect of family ownership. 
Key word:  Family firm; Business group; Diversification; Performance; Ultimate owner. 
JEL Code: L25, M21. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In world economies, families are among the most important shareholders in business organisations 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2015). There are 
multiple definitions of a family business (Mazzi, 2011), although there appears to be consensus in 
that a firm is a family business when family members own a majority of shares, are involved in 
management, form part of the board of directors and wish to transmit the firm to subsequent 
generations (Mazzi, 2011).   
The family nature of a business group determines strategies (Dawson and Mussolino, 2014; 
Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2015), including diversification (Banalieva and Eddleston, 2011; 
Praet, 2013) and its subsequent impact on performance (Kang, 1999; Muñoz y Sánchez, 2011). 
Family members not only pursue financial targets, but also aim to maintain socio-emotional wealth 
(Gomez-Mejia, Makri and Larraza, 2010; Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz and Gomez-Mejia, 2012; 
Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013). Family groups will thus prefer diversification strategies that are 
compatible with maintaining socio-emotional wealth that do not endanger survival, with an impact 
on performance. 
Initially, the lack of socio-emotional wealth in non-family enterprises means that they aim to 
maximise performance. However, do all non-family groups act the same? In non-family groups 
where there is no shareholder of reference (who can exercise effective control), management has 
more discretionary power and tends to aim to satisfy its own needs instead of creating value for 
shareholders, with a negative impact on performance (Jensen, 1986). In this respect, managers can 
use diversification to improve their income and prestige, even if it has a negative impact on 
business performance (Jensen, 1986). The presence of a shareholder of reference in other non-
family groups (banks, foreign firms) facilitates the goal of maximising performance, and thus the 
use of more appropriate diversification strategies. 
Given the above characteristics of family holdings and the differences with non-family groups 
(primarily with groups “with no effective control”, where there is no shareholder of reference), 
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there are two questions that this study attempts to answer. How does family control and degree of 
diversification affect performance, both individually and together? What are the differences in 
relation to different non-family businesses, specifically where there is no shareholder of reference?   
A family can decide not to participate in new profitable businesses due to the need for new 
financial, human and material resources, and the possible loss of control derived from new 
shareholders, which would have a negative effect on socio-emotional wealth (Cennamo et al., 
2012). In these cases, non-family groups have the advantage of not having to consider socio-
emotional wealth in their utility function. The desire for a family firm’s survival and transmission, 
however, generates a greater concern related to new medium and long-term profitable investments, 
as family members would carefully choose diversification projects that have a real positive impact 
on performance, thus revealing an advantage relative to non-family enterprises, where there is no 
desire to transmit ownership to subsequent generations. All these differences between family and 
non-family corporations would also be greater in relation to groups “with no effective control” due 
to the lack of a shareholder of reference and the difference between managers’ and shareholders’ 
interests. 
Both family control and diversification are determinants of business performance, albeit with mixed 
conclusions in the literature (Miller, Le Breton Miller and Scholnick, 2008; Benito, Guerras and 
Zuñiga, 2012). There are few studies, however, that analyse the joint effect of family control and 
diversification on business performance, other than Kang (1999) and Muñoz and Sánchez (2011). 
This, the lack of homogeneity in the conclusions of previous research, and the lack of studies 
considering the nature of the ultimate owner of non-family groups, justify the need to delve deeper 
into the individual and joint impact of family control and diversification on performance. 
This study also aims to advance in the analysis of the impact of diversification and family control 
on performance. The study has several objectives. The first is to analyse the individual impact on 
degree of diversification and family control on performance. The second is to establish differences 
in performance between family and non-family holdings, with the latter including the nature of the 
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ultimate owner. In this case, the differences will be established relative to groups with no 
shareholder of reference (“without effective control”), rather than to family groups, although also 
considering groups controlled by banks and foreign agents. The third and final objective consists of 
determining the joint impact of family control and diversification on performance, thus determining 
whether family ownership, in which the preservation of socio-emotional wealth is key, can affect 
the use of more or less successful diversification strategies compared with non-family groups in 
general, and groups “without effective control” in particular. 
We thus analyse a sample of 99 corporations, the parent companies of which were listed on the 
Spanish stock exchange during the 2000-2005 period. The Heckman two-step correction (1979) is 
used to test the established hypotheses, as it corrects the selection bias derived from diversification 
and the possible existence of endogeneity derived from family ownership (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985).  
The study makes several contributions to the field of research. Firstly, the analytical unit is a 
business group, comprising a listed parent company and a set of subsidiaries. The activities of both 
the listed parent company and its subsidiaries provide a clearer idea of corporate strategy, and the 
market’s evaluation of the parent company shows investor expectations not only regarding the 
company itself but also in relation to the entire group.   
Secondly, when analysing the impact of the nature of the ultimate owner on performance, we 
compare businesses controlled by family members with non-family groups, with reference to 
groups with greater managerial discretionality and/or which do not have a shareholder of reference. 
The aim is to discover whether family ownership has a more positive impact on performance than 
other corporations with greater managerial discretionality (with a negative impact on performance). 
Following this analysis, we check for the existence of similarity of performance of family groups 
and groups controlled by banks and/or foreign agents, as managerial discretionality is more reduces 
in these cases, with a shareholder of reference.   
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Finally, we aim to provide new evidence for Spain considering the moderating effect of family 
ownership on the diversification/creation of value ratio. 
This paper is structured as follows: we first establish the theoretical framework in which our 
hypotheses regarding the impact of diversification and family control on performance are 
formulated. We then describe the database, the variables and the methodology used to test said 
hypotheses. Thirdly, we present and analyse the results of the econometric models. Finally, we 
summarise the study’s main conclusions, its limitations and future lines of research. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
The decision to diversify forms a fundamental part of the strategic behaviour of corporations (Hitt, 
Hoskisson and Ireland, 1994), and plays a key role in enhancing their performance (Hull and Lee, 
1999). Diversification involves participating in new business or markets by launching new products 
(Ansoff, 1976). By performing new activities, firms can make us of surplus resources and 
capabilities (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991), generating synergies between activities and making 
the most of opportunities to invest in businesses that favour the creation of value (Martin and 
Sayrak, 2003). Diversification, however, increases coordination costs and information asymmetries 
(Denis, Denis and Yost, 2002), with which the firm’s inflexibility costs grow (Porter, 1985) and its 
ability to react to market changes diminishes. The literature often refers to diversification discount, 
which anticipates a negative impact of diversification on performance (Villalonga 2004). 
From an agency theory perspective, diversification is the result of greater managerial 
discretionality; by increasing the size of the company, managers seek higher salaries, a reduction in 
personal risk, secure job positions and greater power (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Jensen and Murphy, 
1990). New investments are not to maximise value for shareholders, but to satisfy managers’ 
particular interests; they have a negative impact on performance and increase agency costs (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990). Furthermore, the greater the degree of diversification, the easier it is for 
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managers to access capital by the use of cross subsidies (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009), 
producing inefficient resource allocation that reduces the firm’s value (Berger y Ofek, 1995). 
The negative impact of diversification on performance, however, is not only due to the conflict 
between shareholders and managers, but can also derive from conflicts between majority and 
minority shareholders. If concentration of ownership is high, part of the wealth of minority 
shareholders can be expropriated by majority shareholders (Lins and Servaes, 2002). Said 
expropriation is easier through diversification, with tunnelling practices reducing the company’s 
value (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2000). Majority shareholders prefer new 
activities that do not aim to maximise performance, but to favour their own interests (Johnson et al., 
2000). Diversification enables tunnelling practices, where assets or results are transferred out of the 
firm in favour of the majority shareholders, or cash flow is transferred from one firm to another 
(Johnson et al., 2000; Lins and Servaes, 2002), all of which has a negative impact on the 
corporation’s performance. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis is: 
H1: Business group’s diversification has a negative impact on performance. 
The impact of family control on performance is a major line of research in the literature, and there 
is no consensus regarding the relationship between the two variables (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Miller, et al., 2008; Sacristán, Gómez and Cabeza, 2011). The impact of family ownership on 
performance depends on the relationship between pros and cons; if the advantages exceed the 
disadvantages there will be a positive relationship between family ownership and performance 
(Dyer, 2006). 
Family ownership and control can have a positive effect on performance (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Sraer and Thesmar, 2007). Family business have high ownership concentration values, with 
family members involved in the firm’s management, with incentives to supervise managers (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983), minimising the principal-agent problem and agency costs (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985). The presence of family executives leads to better performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 
Kowalewski, Talavera and Stetsyuk, 2010). Family control, however, can also have a negative 
effect (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005), as a high concentration of 
ownership in family firms can generate an agency problem between family members and other 
investors (minority shareholders) (Zahra, 2007; Chrisman, Chua, Pearson and Barnett, 2012). The 
family can present an opportunistic conduct satisfying its private needs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Jara, López and López, 2008), taking part of the wealth belonging to minority shareholders 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and thus having a negative effect on the 
creation of value (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). 
Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nuñez, Jacobson and Moyano (2007), propose a model in which family 
enterprises are adverse to socio-emotional wealth loss. According to Cennamo et al. (2012), socio-
emotional wealth includes elements such as the desire to maintain family control, the family’s 
identification with the company, the presence of emotional links and the desire to ensure the firm’s 
survival. The family’s utility function thus maximises both socio-emotional wealth and financial 
performance (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). The desire to maintain control of the firm and to preserve 
family links leads to priority being given to socio-emotional wealth versus financial performance 
(providing that the firm’s survival is not at risk), and families are willing to sacrifice greater profits 
for the same of socio-emotional wealth. A negative relationship is therefore expected between 
control and performance. According to the socio-emotional wealth model, we establish the second 
hypothesis: 
H2: Family control has a negative impact on business group’s performance. 
Non-family corporations can be controlled by foreign agents, banks or the State, etc. From the 
agency theory perspective, however, the principal-agent problem is greater in groups where 
ownership is more disperse and no single shareholder has effective control of the firm; managers 
aim to satisfy their own needs, which are not the same as those of the other shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). In these groups (with no effective control), agency costs will be higher and 
have a more negative effect on performance (Amihud and Lev, 1981).   
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When comparing corporations considering the nature of the ultimate owner, the greatest differences 
are expected to be found between groups “with no effective control” and family enterprises, where 
family control leads to a reduction in agency costs. Family groups thus perform better than firms 
with disperse ownership or no shareholder of reference (Wang, 2006). This leads to our third 
hypothesis: 
H3: Family business groups perform better than groups where there is no controlling shareholder 
(groups “with no effective control”). 
After analysing the individual impact of diversification and family control on performance, the 
following question arises. Could the impact of diversification on performance be conditioned by 
family control? In other words, does family control ensure a more or less successful diversification 
process, having a positive or negative moderating effect on performance compared to non-family 
groups?  
There are very few studies in the literature that answer these questions. A first approximation was 
provided by Kang (1999). For a set of listed textile companies, it was found that family ownership 
favours a positive impact of diversification on performance. According to Kang (1999), although 
family enterprises are more reluctant to diversify, when the do decide to do so, they invest in 
activities that have a more positive effect on performance, with a view to ensuring the firm’s 
survival and transmission to subsequent generations. Family firms thus do not diversify for reasons 
derived from managerial discretionary power, more common in non-family firms that aim to 
maximise managers’ utility function (Jensen, 1986), with a negative impact on performance. 
The study conducted by Muñoz and Sánchez (2011) from a group of European firms from 27 
countries, showed that family firms are more profitable than non-family enterprises when 
diversifying both by product and internationally, although there are no differences if diversification 
only affects product. According to Muñoz and Sánchez (2011), family firms are more reluctant to 
accept the change involved in diversification, given that their goal is to preserve family values and 
maintain control of the company. They do not diversify, therefore until they have the experience 
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and know-how required to ensure the best possible performance. The family will diversify when it 
has the required know-how, making use of existing synergies and reducing dependence on a single 
firm’s income and/or a single country, increasing the likelihood of survival and the preservation of 
its assets (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). 
From a theoretical perspective, family firms seek survival (Casson, 1999), preferring diversification 
strategies that create value without harming socio-emotional wealth. So although family firms are 
more reluctant to diversify than others (May, 1995; Goranova, Alessandri, Brandes and Dharwadkar 
2007), when they do decide to participate in new businesses they have to satisfy their particular 
objectives without reducing socio-emotional wealth. When comparing family and other enterprises, 
then, diversification is expected to have a positive impact on the former’s performance.  
However, a “principal-principal” agency problem may arise (Zahra, 2007), in which case 
diversification strategies facilitate the expropriation of the wealth of minority shareholders in favour 
of the family, with a negative impact on performance. Diversification enables the use of tunnelling 
practices (Johnson et al., 2000), with which the family can expropriate part of the wealth of 
minority shareholders by transferring assets elsewhere, or by transferring cash flow between firms 
in favour of family interests (Lins and Servaes, 2002). Diversification also enables family members 
to work in the corporation’s different companies (nepotism), with a negative effect on performance 
(Faccio, Lang and Young, 2001). Given these arguments, it is difficult to quantify whether 
tunnelling practices have a more negative impact on the effect of diversification on performance, 
compared to diversification processes in non-family groups, where they depend on more or less 
managerial discretionality. Two hypotheses are therefore considered: 
H4a: Family control has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between degree of 
diversification and performance. 
H4b: Family control does not have a moderating effect on the relationship between degree of 
diversification and performance. 
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The greatest differences related to family control are found between family groups and enterprises 
“with no effective control”. In the latter, diversification is the result of the pursuit of satisfaction of 
managers’ private interests, choosing strategies that can have a negative impact on given the greater 
agency costs (Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1997). Yet although family firms are more reluctant to 
diversify, and the preservation of socio-emotional wealth can lead to less performance than non-
family groups, when a family form decides to perform new activities, which are not derived from a 
principal-principal agency problem, the goal of creating value would have a positive impact on the 
interaction between family ownership and diversification (Kang, 1999). Our final hypothesis, 
therefore, is: 
H5: Family control has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between degree of 
diversification and performance relative to groups with no controlling shareholder (group “with no 
effective control”). 
 
3. SAMPLE, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample 
 
The study sample comprises business groups in which the parent company was listed on the 
Spanish stock market in each year of the 2000-2005 period. We have excluded groups in which the 
parent company belongs to the financial and/or energy sectors, as they have specific legal and 
accounting standards. The sample finally consists of 99 corporations (99 listed companies that head 
business groups). Two databases were fundamentally used: the National Stock Market Commission 
website (www.cnmv.es) and the SABI-Informa database. With regards to the former, we used the 
account reports available to obtain the economic-financial information used in the study, and to 
identify all the firms included in the business groups. The CNMV website provides information 
about significant shareholdings, identifying the nature of the ultimate owner of the corporation.   
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Secondly, we also used the SABI-Informa database, which identifies the ultimate owner and its 
nature, enabling us to estimate the corporation’s degree of diversification, with access not only to 
the economic-financial information of the parent company, but also to accounting information 
pertaining to its subsidiaries.  
Fifty (50) of the 99 listed parent company are under family control; this is the largest group, 
showing the importance of families on the Spanish stock exchange (Santana and Aguiar, 2006; 
Sacristán, et al., 2011). There are also 13 groups “without effective control”; these groups do not 
have a single owner (or group of similar owners) with effective control of the organisation. There 
are also 10 groups controlled by banks and 6 by foreign agents. The ultimate owner varied in 20 
groups during the analysed period. Although they are included in the subsequent analyses, they are 
not subject to a detailed study, as creation of value will be affected by the nature of the ultimate 
owners each year, and it would be difficult to determine their net effect on Tobin’s q-value. 
 
3.2. Variables 
 
When analysing the relationship between diversification, family ownership and performance, it is 
very common in the literature to use Tobin’s q-value as a dependent variable (Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester and Canella, 2007). 
Tobin’s q is a measure of profitability in market terms. It reflects the parent company’s expectations 
for future profits, and hence the holding’s evaluation by investors. Tobin’s q-value is calculated as 
the ratio between the parent company’s market value and total assets (book value). The market 
value is the sum of the market value of its equity and the book value of its debt (Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001; Martínez, Stohr and Quiroga, 2007). The market value of its equity was estimated 
by multiplying share value at the end of each year (31 December) by the total number of listed 
shares. 
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As independent variables, when defining corporation, it is established as the listed parent company 
plus all subsidiaries, according to the criterion established by the Spanish General Accounting Plan 
of 2007, firms where the parent company has the majority of the voting rights and/or the ability to 
appoint or dismiss most of the members of the board of directors. Companies that form part of a 
business group are identified in the annual report published by the listed parent company.     
A firm is considered to have a ultimate owner when its leading shareholder directly or indirectly has 
10 per cent or more of the voting rights (La Porta et al., 1999). The ultimate owner is identified by 
control chains. When a firm’s shares are held by another company, the voting rights of the latter are 
analysed, identifying its main shareholder, and so on as far as the ultimate owner of the voting 
rights.   
A group is considered to be a family enterprise when family members represent the majority owners 
(directly and indirectly) of the parent company and one or several family members are in key 
positions as managers or members of the board of directors; the group is a family concern 
throughout the study period (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006). Family members share a surname 
or are connected by marriage. This definition of family firm is based on the proposals of the 
European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/promoting-entrepreneurship/we-work-
for/family-business/index_en.htm) and Instituto de Empresa Familiar 
(http://www.iefamiliar.com/web/es/ief.html). 
Groups are therefore classified as: 
a) Family groups (FAM): groups in which the ultimate owners are Spanish family members 
throughout the study period. 
b) Foreign group (FOR): groups in which the ultimate owners are firms or individuals not residing 
in Spain. 
c) Financial groups (FINAN): groups in which the ultimate owners are banks or investment funds 
throughout the study period. 
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d) Groups without effective control (NEC): groups in which there is no a single owner (or group of 
similar owners) with effective control of the organisation throughout the study period. 
e) Groups with changes in ultimate owners (CUO): groups in which the nature of the ultimate 
owner changed during the study period. 
Degree of diversification (TOTAL DIV) is established considering all the activities performed in 
the business group, both by the parent company and by the pyramid of subsidiaries. Primary activity 
and turnover are identified for all the firms in the group (parent and subsidiaries). Considering 
group activities measures diversification more objectively, as a study of only the parent company’s 
activities would ignore those of the subsidiaries, which also form part of the corporation’s global 
strategy (Chen and Yu, 2011). Degree of diversification is measured by the entropy index 
(Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985). 
According to prior research concerning creation of value, diversification and family ownership 
(Kang, 1999; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Ducassy and Prevot, 2010; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Chen and Yu, 2011), the following control variables are considered: i) 
Capital in the hands of the parent company’s five main shareholders (% 5 SHARE), which is 
established as a measure of concentration of ownership; ii) size of listed parent company (LN 
ASSETS), measured as the parent company’s total assets expressed as logarithms iii) age (LN 
AGE),  measured as the logarithm of the difference between two thousand and the year of 
establishment of the listed parent company; iv) indebtedness (DEBT), measured as the ratio 
between the listed parent company’s total liabilities and total assets; v) capital intensity (CAP INT), 
measured as the ratio between the sum of tangible and non-tangible assets and the number of 
employees of the listed parent company; vi) non-tangible investment (NO TANG), the listed parent 
company’s investment in the new technologies, measured by the ratio between intangible assets and 
total assets; vii) structural change in parent company (SCH), a dummy variable with a value of 1 
when there has been a structural change in the listed parent company and 0 otherwise.  
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 
3.3. Methodology 
 
In the results (see section 4), we first present a descriptive analysis of the model’s different 
variables, considering the family and non-family ownership of the different business groups, 
estimating the possible mean differences according to the nature of the ultimate owner. We first 
estimate the Student’s t-values to test the mean differences between family and non-family groups, 
then apply the Brown-Forsythe and Kruskal-Wallis tests, which test the mean differences between 
family groups and each of the different types of non-family group (foreign, financial and “with no 
effective control”).    
Heckman’s two-step correction (1979) is used to test the five hypotheses. This method is regularly 
used in the literature when analysing the relationship between performance, diversification and 
family control (Kang, 1999; Maury, 2006; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Miller, et al., 2007). The 
Heckman two-step method corrects the selection bias derived from diversification (Kang, 1999), 
and considers the effect of the possible endogeneity derived from the business group’s family 
ownership (Demsetz y Lehn, 1985).   
A Probit model is used in the first stem, in which the endogenous variable is a dummy variable of 
diversification (value is 1 if the group diversifies and 0 otherwise), and the exogenous variables are 
used in the model (nature of ultimate owner, diversification, concentration of ownership and control 
variables). A new variable is added in this first step, the annual growth rate of sales, in order to 
prevent possible multicollinearity problems when applying Heckman. Finally, the inverse Mills 
ratio that corresponds to the decision to diversify (λdiv) is calculated. 
Another Probit model is also estimated in order to analyse the endogenous nature of family 
ownership, in which the dependent variable is he group’s family ownership, and the explanatory 
variables are sectoral dummies, firm size and cost of debt. This estimates the inverse Mills ratio that 
corresponds to family ownership (λfam).  
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In the second step of the Heckman model, we estimate an ordinary least squares regression 
analysing the impact of the exogenous variables (nature of ultimate owner, diversification, 
concentration of ownership and control variables) on Tobin’s q-value, including the previously 
analysed inverse Mills ratios (λdiv and λfam), correcting the possible selection bias due to 
diversification and the endogeneity of family ownership.    
    
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
Table 1 shows the mean values of the model’s variables and the existence of differences according 
to the nature of the ultimate owner. When comparing the family with the non-family groups, the 
results show that the former present a lower mean Tobin’s q-value (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; 
Cronquvist and Nilsson, 2003): 1.640 for family groups and 2.044 for non-family groups. There is 
also a lower mean degree of diversification in family groups (0.506 versus 0.731 for non-family 
enterprises), similar to the results obtained by Anderson and Reeb, (2003) and Miller, Le Bretton 
Miller and Lester (2010).  
In greater detail, considering the nature of the ultimate owner of non-family groups, family 
enterprises present a lower Tobin’s q-value (except foreign groups). As shown on Table 1, financial 
groups present the highest mean Tobin’s q-value (2,425), followed by groups “with no effective 
control” (mean Tobin’s q-value = 2.123), family groups (mean Tobin’s q-value = 1.640) and 
foreign groups (1.483). Similarly, family groups are characterised by a lower degree of 
diversification, with the greatest differences between family groups and groups “with no effective 
control” (the mean degree of diversification in family groups is 0.506 versus 0.765 in groups “with 
no effective control”).   
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
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4.2. Econometric analysis 
 
Table 2 analyses the impact of diversification and family ownership on Tobin’s q-value. The results 
correspond to the second step of Heckman’s two-step correction, including the inverse Mills ratios 
relative to diversification (λdiv) and to family ownership (λfam). 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Model 1 on Table 2 shows how the business group’s degree of diversification (=0.044, >0.10) 
does not affect Tobin’s q-value, meaning that an increase in the number of new activities performed 
by the group has no impact on performance (rejecting H1). These results are similar to those 
obtained by Delios and Beamish (1999), Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002), and Muñoz and 
Sánchez (2011). There is therefore no diversification discount (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Villalonga, 
2004), as a greater degree of diversification does not affect performance, measured by Tobin’s q-
value. One possible explanation lies in the fact that the increase in costs derived from greater 
diversification is compensated by the synergies derived from new activities (Palepu, 1985), so that 
the negative effect of the former is compensated by the positive effect of the latter. Also, as 
mentioned by Campa and Kedia (2002), diversification can occur due to the poor performance of 
the original business, in which case degree of diversification is the result of a process aimed at 
maximising shareholder returns. Indeed, firms obtain a poor performance before the diversification 
process, so it does not necessarily determine the diversification discount (Campa and Kedia, 2002). 
Model 2 shows how family control has a negative impact on Tobin’s q-value (=-0.222, <0.01). In 
other words, market evaluation of family groups is lower than that of non-family enterprises, 
confirming hypothesis H2 (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). The 
goal to maintain socio-emotional wealth (keeping control of the business, preserve family 
connections, transfer the business to subsequent generations, etc.) makes families give greater 
importance to it than to financial performance (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), providing that it does not 
endanger the family business’ survival (Cennamo et al., 2012).   
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In greater detail, model 3 shows that the differences between family and other groups largely lie in 
the greater creation of value (measured by Tobin’s q-value) in groups controlled by financial 
enterprises (=0.539, <0.01) and foreign agents (=1.599, <0.05) than in others, including family 
groups (=0.156, >0.10) (rejection of H3). There is a difference in the impact of the type of 
ultimate owner on performance, which is positive in financial groups and foreign enterprises, and 
zero in family groups and groups “with no effective control”. The results show that the preservation 
of socio-emotional wealth in family groups decreases financial performance, which is not the 
priority (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 2010). However, even considering this circumstance, family 
groups were expected to show a better performance than groups “with no effective control”, where 
it is reduced by managerial discretionary power. Therefore, the results obtained show that the effect 
of the preservation of socio-emotional wealth on performance is similar to the effect of the lack of a 
shareholder of reference, and no differences are found between the two groups. However, compared 
with financial and foreign groups, the latter do obtain a better performance, as they have 
shareholders of reference and socio-emotional wealth is not part of their utility functions, which 
focus on maximising profits.   
Model 4 includes diversification and family control in the same regression, with reference to groups 
“with no effective control”. The inclusion of diversification relative to model 3 does not affect 
performance, and financial groups (=0.571, <0.01) and foreign enterprises (=1.663, <0.01) 
obtain a better market evaluation than groups with no effective control, and family groups 
(=0.155, >0.10) (rejection of hypothesis H3). This confirms the results obtained in model 3, 
enabling is to distinguish between family and “no effective control” groups on the one hand, and 
foreign and financial groups on the other, where the nature of the latter increases Tobin’s q-value. 
Finally, models 5 and 6 consider the interaction of family control and degree of diversification, 
establishing a comparison between family and non-family groups (model 5) and between family 
groups and groups “with no effective control” (model 6). This tests the possible moderating effect 
of family control on the relationship between degree of diversification and performance (Kang, 
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1999; Muñoz and Sánchez, 2011). Both models show that family control does not affect the impact 
of diversification on Tobin’s q-value (in model 5, =-0.218, >0.10, and in model 6, =0.153, 
>0.10). In other words, family control does not have a moderating effect on the relationship 
between diversification and performance, similar to non-family enterprises in general (Muñoz and 
Sánchez, 2011) or if we compare with groups “with no effective control” in particular. This 
confirms hypothesis H4b, rejecting hypotheses H4a and H5. 
The above results show that the family nature of a business group does not affect the impact of 
diversification on performance. Although the goal to maintain socio-emotional wealth favours 
investments that increase performance (Muñoz and Sánchez, 2011), a principal-principal agency 
problem (between the family and non-family shareholders) (Zahra, 2007) can lead to investments in 
new businesses that do not maximise profits, which would explain the results obtained. Another 
possibility to be considered is that a family business diversifies but lacks the know-how or skills 
required in the new businesses (Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2002), which would hinder the use of 
synergies and reduce the positive impact of diversification on performance.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE LINES OF RESEARCH 
 
This paper represents a contribution to the fields of family business, diversification strategies and 
performance, providing new evidence about the individual and joint impact of family control and 
degree of diversification on market evaluation, considering business groups as the analytical unit, 
and classifying non-family groups according to the nature of their ultimate owner. After analysing a 
sample of business groups in which the parent company is listed, the results confirm that there is a 
relationship between family control and performance, and that family control has little impact on 
the effect of diversification on performance, measured by Tobin’s q-value. 
In a first approximation, we find that family groups are characterised by a worse market evaluation 
than non-family enterprises (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Cronquvist and Nilsson, 2003), and that 
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the differences are greater relative to groups controlled by financial concerns and groups “with no 
effective control”. Family businesses also show a smaller degree of diversification than non-family 
firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Miller and Le Bretton Miller, 2010), and the differences are 
greater relative to groups with no shareholder of reference. The family’s involvement in 
management aligns its interests with those of other shareholders, leading to a smaller degree of 
diversification in family groups relative to those where managers have greater discretionality 
(Goranova et al., 2007). The aim to preserve socio-emotional wealth also generated less interest in 
new activities, as this could lead to loss of control of the company (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 
2010). 
When analysing the effect of degree of diversification on a business group’s performance, the 
results show that there is zero impact (Graham et al., 2002; Chen and Yu, 2011; Muñoz and 
Sánchez, 2011); in other words, there is no diversification discount (Villalonga, 2004). This could 
be because Spanish groups are characterised by high levels of concentration of ownership (Santana 
and Aguiar, 2006), which enable the alignment of shareholder and manager interests, thus 
preventing new activities that could harm the group’s performance (Berger and Ofek, 1995). The 
selection bias of diversification was corrected in the models, studying the possible endogeneity 
between diversification and performance (Graham et al., 2002), which can affect the results 
obtained (Sacristán et al., 2011). 
When comparing the impact of type of group on the creation of value, we find that family control 
has a negative impact on performance (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; 
Morck et al., 2005). The desire to maintain socio-emotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 
2010) means that families are more willing to renounce part of their business profits in order to 
ensure control of the company and maintain all emotional connections. These results show how 
markets anticipate that problems derived from family control exceed its advantages. Although 
family groups seek the survival of the business (Casson, 1999) and have a longer-term perspective, 
a high concentration of shares owned by family members can give rise to problems between 
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majority and minority shareholders (Zahra, 2007), causing internal conflicts and opportunistic 
behaviour by the family relative to other investors (Astrachan, 2010).  
Finally, when considering the joint effect of family control and diversification on performance, we 
find that family control does not have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between 
diversification and performance (Muñoz and Sánchez, 2011). When considering nature of the 
ultimate owner, family groups and groups “with no effective control” are similar, and Tobin’s q-
value is not affected. The performance of new activities by family enterprises is seen by investors in 
the same way as for non-family groups, as the market does not positively evaluate that a family’s 
diversification could increase the company’s value. On the other hand, Tobin’s q-value is positively 
affected when the business group is controlled by foreign agents or financial institutions. These 
results could show that investors prefer groups where financial objectives and the creation of value 
are more evident (financial groups and groups controlled by foreign agents who invest in Spain 
based on ROI criteria) rather than in groups “with no effective control” or family enterprises where 
creation of value can be compromised (either due to managerial discretionality in the former or to 
problems derived from family control in the latter). 
Finally, several contributions are made relative to previous research. For Spain, the study provides 
new evidence regarding the impact of family control and diversification on performance. It 
specifically considers major Spanish corporations with listed parent companies, so that the measure 
of diversification refers to the entire group (parent company and subsidiaries). The use of Tobin’s q-
value as a measure of performance also shows investors’ expectations not only in relation to the 
listed parent company, but also in relation to the entire business group. Comparisons are also made 
between family groups and different types of non-family corporations according to the nature of the 
ultimate owner, and the moderating effect of family control on the relationship between 
diversification and performance, an aspect hardly considered in family business literature, is also 
studied. 
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The research has several limitations. Firstly, the results obtained correspond to a period before the 
economic crisis (2000-2005). It would be a good idea to update the database in order to replicate the 
study for the years of economic recession. We could then see whether the economic crisis affected 
degree of diversification (resulting from readjustments and the sale of unprofitable businesses), the 
nature of the ultimate owner (possible changes in the number of groups controlled by families, 
financial or foreign institutions or “with no effective control”) and performance (reduced as a result 
of the economic crisis). It could also be studied whether there have been changes in the joint effect 
of diversification and family control on performance. 
A second limitation of the study is that the results are valid for business groups with listed parent 
companies, and cannot be generalised to unlisted enterprises. The following questions also arise. 
Why are their family groups with listed parent companies and others with unlisted parent firms? Do 
they not meet the requirements of the Spanish stock markets, or do they prefer not to be listed? 
What could the reasons be, to preserve socio-emotional wealth or others? The answers to these 
questions, together with a study of unlisted corporations, could lead to new lines of research. 
A third limitation is that only the nature of the group’s main shareholder is considered. Other 
shareholders often play a relevant role regarding strategy, an aspect not analysed here. It would 
therefore be interesting to analyse the ownership structure of family groups in greater detail, 
controlling the presence of other important shareholders that could affect strategic decision-making 
(Jara, et al., 2008; Sacristán, et al., 2011), with an impact on both degree of diversification and 
performance. The characteristics of the board of directors and firm management, the presence of 
independent external executives and the greater or smaller presence of family board members 
(Minichilli, Corbetta and Macmillan, 2010) are factors that can affect diversification strategies, and 
should be controlled in future research. 
Finally, the results of the study show how control by financial institutions and foreign agents 
improves performance, while it is not affected by family firms and groups “with no effective 
control”. There is therefore a need to study the differences between family, foreign and financial 
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groups. However, from the perspective of agency theory and socio-emotional wealth, if there is a 
clear difference between family firms and groups “with no effective control”, why are there 
differences between family, financial and foreign groups? In all three cases there is an ultimate 
owner who can exercise effective control. However, the objectives established by financial and 
foreign groups are different, as family groups give priority to the preservation of socio-emotional 
wealth. There is therefore a need to discover the reasons for said differences, and how they can 
affect both diversification and performance. 
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Table 1: Mean differences in study variables, according to the nature of the corporation’s ultimate owner   
  
   
T-
Student 
Non-family groups 
Brown-
Forsythe 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
  
Family 
(n=300) 
Non-family 
(n=294) 
Foreign 
(n=36) 
Financial 
(n=60) 
No effective 
control 
(n=78) 
Changes 
ultimate owner 
(n=120) 
Tobin’s Q-Value 1,640 2,044 *** 1,483 2,425 2,123 1,917 *** *** 
Total Diversification 0,506 0,731 *** 0,583 0,593 0,765 0,819 *** *** 
% 5 share 0,659 0,483 *** 0,683 0,519 0,493 0,399 ** ** 
Ln assets 11,46 12,45 *** 12,61 12,44 12,32 12,5 ** ** 
Ln age 3,59 3,66   3,66 3,75 4,02 3,38 *   
Indebtedness 0,37 0,39   0,31 0,40 0,36 0,43 *   
Non-tangible 0,025 0,034   0,010 0,022 0,054 0,034 *** *** 
Capital intensity 4,56 4,84 * 5,06 4,77 4,57 5     
Structural change 18% 27% ** 18,70% 30% 23,10% 30% *** ** 
 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** < .001 
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Table 2: Individual and joint impact of degree of diversification and nature of last owner on Tobin’s Q-value 
(second step of the Heckman correction) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FAM 
 -0,222*** 0,156 0,155 -0,218 0,153 
 (-2,77) (1,15) (1,14) (-1,38) (0,80) 
FOR 
  1,599** 1,663***  1,662*** 
  (5,90) (6,09)  (6,06) 
FINAN 
  0,539*** 0,571***  0,571*** 
  (3,17) (3,35)  (3,34) 
NEC 
  0,134 0,121  0,121 
  (0,93) (0.84)  (0,84) 
TOTAL DIV 
0,044   0,116 -0,024 0,115 
(0,65)   (1,59) (-0,22) (0,92) 
FAM * TOTAL DIV 
    0,079 0,002 
    (0,52) (0,01) 
       
       
div 
-0,789***   -0,682** -0,539** -0,682** 
(-3,69)   (-2,43) (-2,18) (2,42) 
fam 
 -0,033 -0,585*** -0,587*** -0,107 -0,588*** 
 (-0,25) (-3,54) (-3,57) (-0,67) (-3,36) 
% 5 SHARE 
-0,361** -0,054 -0,610*** -0,610*** -0,165 -0,611*** 
(-2,31) (-0,30) (-2,97) (2,98) (-0,75) (-2,89) 
LN ASSETS 
-0,032 0,045 -0,049 -0,045 -0,039 -0,045 
(-0,59) (0,90) (-0,64) (-0,59) (-0,57) (-0,58) 
LN AGE 
0,053 -0,044 -0,017 -0,034 -0,007 -0,034 
(1,10) (-0,92) (-0,32) (-0,61) (-0,13) (-0,60) 
DEBT 
0,162 0,002 0,594** 0,547** 0,324 0,547** 
(0,78) (0,01) (2,24) (2,06) (1,27) (2,05) 
NO TANG 
2,364*** 0,196 1,337 1,780* 0,670 1,777* 
(4,05) (0,28) (1,42) (1,82) (0,97) (1,77) 
CAP INT 
-0,078*** -0,110*** -0,021 -0,015 -0,081*** -0,015 
(-3,38) (-5,42) (-0,78) (-0,55) (-2,64) (-0,55) 
SCH 
0,204** 0,370*** 0,365*** 0,327*** 0,284*** 0,327*** 
(1,99) (3,59) (3,28) (2,89) (2,66)   (2,75) 
CONSTANT 
1,092 0,578 1,548* 1,449* 1,445** 0,145* 
(1,62) (1,06) (1,91) (1,79) (1,99) (1,78) 
F-Value 8,73*** 6,03*** 6.33*** 6,16*** 4,61*** 5,83*** 
R
2 0,2535 0,1935 0,2773 0,2834 0,1853 0,2834 
R
2
-adjusted 0,2245 0,1615 0,2335 0,2375 0,1388 0,2349 
N 375 367 316 316 316 316 
 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** < .001 
 
 
 
